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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V

V .

JOHNNIE BASKINS,

Case No. 20090810

Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Johnnie Baskins, by and through his attorney of record contends that this Court
does have jurisdiction to address this appeal because he did not unambiguously withdraw
his motion to withdraw the plea. The trial court, he contends, did not clearly and
unambiguously establish Mr. Baskins' intent on the record. Additionally, he claims that
his silence, when the court withdrew the motion, cannot count as valid relinquishment of
his constitutional right to jury trial. Finally, the trial court failed to make adequate
findings upon which to make a determination on this issue on appellate review.

ARGUMENT
L THIS COURT DOES HAVE JURISDICTION TO ADDRESS THIS APPEAL
BECAUSE MR, BASKINS DID NOT UNAMBIGUOSLY WITHDRAW HIS
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE ADEQUATE
FINDINGS UPON WHICH TO BASE THIS CONCLUSION.

According to the state, Mr. Baskins "unambiguously withdrew his motion, thereby
depriving this Court of jurisdiction." Aplee's Br. at 16. Specifically, the state argues that
Mr. Baskins' silence when the court proceeded with sentencing constituted "approval of
the court's acceptance of his withdrawl of the motion." Aplee's Br. at 19. This contention
is erroneous for two reasons. First, the record reflects that Mr. Baskins did not
unambiguously withdraw his motion. Second, Mr. Baskins' silence cannot be construed
as a valid waiver of a constitutional right.
A. Mr. Baskins Did Not Unambiguously Withdraw His Motion
First, the record does not demonstrate that Mr. Baskins affirmatively and
unambiguously withdrew his motion. His counsel stated to the court that Mr. Baskins
wished to withdraw his motion. The court then asked,
The Court: Mr. Baskins, is that what you want to do? I guess you had filled it out
yourself or filed it on your own without your attorney?
Mr. Baskins: Yes.
The Court: Okay.
Mr. Allen: We've - we do want to talk a little bit about some of the facts of the
case.
The Court: Okay.

Mr. Allen: But I understand the victim is here. Maybe it would be helpful to have
them go first.
The Court: All rights. So we'll go ahead and withdraw the motion. You say you
want to have the State heard first on this or do you want Mr. Allen: I think the victim is here ...
(R. 98:2-3.) Mr. Baskins did not speak again until nearly ten pages later in the transcript,
and it was to contest the facts surrounding the case. Id. at 13-14. Yet, the court's question
was actually a three-part question. First, it asked whether Mr. Baskins wanted to
withdraw his motion. Second, it asked whether Mr. Baskins had filled out the motion
himself. Third, it asked whether he filed the motion himself without his attorney's advice.
Mr. Baskins' answer was a simple, "Yes," and the record does not demonstrate which
question he was answering. This answer cannot be sufficient to demonstrate that Mr.
Baskins was knowingly and intelligently withdrawing his motion. As the defendant's
motion indicated, he was dissatisfied with counsel and with the plea agreement—the
court in this situation had an obligation to clarify with Mr. Baskins his specific intentions.
A "yes" to a compound question cannot be taken as an "unambiguous" waiver. In
one case, this Court reversed a conviction because the judge, at voir dire, asked a single
compound question to three jurors, which single question failed to "rebut an inference of
bias" among the jurors. State v. Woolley. 810 P.2d 440,441 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
826 P,2d 651 (Utah 1991). The Court was troubled that the jurors were not "questioned
individually and each allowed to respond verbally." Id at 448. If this Court has been
troubled at the use of a compound question to probe jurors about bias, then it certainly
3

should be troubled about the use of a compound question as an adequate basis for
withdrawl of a motion in which one reclaims his right to jury trial. In fact, this Court
reversed the conviction for this failure in the Wooley case.
B. Mr, Baskins Did Not Unambiguously Withdraw His Motion by Silence
The state asserts that because Mr. Baskins remained silent, he accepted the court's
withdrawl of the motion. Aplee's Br. at 17-23. This argument ultimately misstates the
standard for relinquishment of constitutional rights.
As the United States Supreme Court has articulated, albeit in the context of the
waiver of the right to counsel:
[CJourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights. A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there
has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case,
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.
Johnson v.Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938) (emphasis added).
As Justice Harlan articulated in his concurring opinion in Dickey v. Florida, 398
U.S. 30 (1970):
[TJhe equation of silence or inaction with waiver is a fiction that has been
categorically rejected by this Court when other fundamental rights are at stake.
Over 30 years ago in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938), we defined
"waiver" as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege." We have made clear that courts should "indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver," Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393

(1937), and that they should "not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights." Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)
Id. at 39. As the Supreme Court pointed out in reference to Miranda and a waiver of the
right to silence,
An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of
the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not
inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question is not
one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily
waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case. As was unequivocally said in
Miranda, mere silence is not enough.
North Carolina v.Butler. 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (emphasis added).
In Utah, the Supreme Court has said that the "general principle in our case law" is
that "mere silence is ordinarily not a waiver, unless there is some duty or obligation to
speak." Soter's v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan. 857 P.2d 935,940 (Utah 1993).
The Utah Supreme Court had to determine whether a defendant, by his silence,
had waived his right to closure of a public trial. State v. Butterfield, 784 P.2d 153, 155-56
(Utah 1989). The court determined that in that case, his silence could constitute a waiver.
But that was because, in the court's opinion, "the right to a public trial" is "of a different
order" than other fundamental rights which would require express waivers.
It is helpful to compare other rights that have been held to require a personal
waiver by the defendant. Among these are the right to trial, which is waived by a
plea, see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,242,23 L. Ed. 2d 274,89 S. Ct. 1709
(1969); the right to be present at trial, see United States v. Gordon, 264 U.S. App.
D.C. 334,829 F.2d 119,123 (D.C. Cir. 1987); the right to trial by jury, see Patton
v. United States, 281 U.S. 276,312,74 L. Ed. 854,50 S. Ct. 253 (1930); and the
right to an interpreter at trial, see People v. Mata Aguilar, 35 Cal. 3d 785,794-95,
677 P.2d 1198,1204,200 Cal. Rptr. 908,914-15 (1984). A unifying characteristic

of these rights appears to be that they are of central importance to the quality of
the guilt-determining process and the defendant's ability to participate in that
process. See, Tigar, Foreward: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the
Citadel, 84 Harv. L. Rev 1,18 (1970) (appropriate focus is on an "assessment of
the significance of a procedural right to the proper defense of an accused").
We judge the right to a public trial to be of a different order.
14 at 115-56.
The court opined that the plea process and a defendant's waiver of his right to trial
constitute fundamental constitutional rights, which require a defendant to make a
personal waiver. See also. State v. Morrey, 64 P. 764,765 (Utah 1901) ("His mere
silence or failure, during the trial, to object to the jurisdiction assumed by the court, did
not constitute a waiver of that right.") As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals said
regarding the court's duty on a defendant's waiver of his right to appeal:
An appeal waiver is not knowingly or voluntarily made if the district court fails to
specifically question the defendant concerning the waiver provision . . . during the
[Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant did not
otherwise understand the full significance of the waiver.
United States v.Johnson, 410 F.3d 137,151 (4th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
This case really has to do with whether Mr. Baskins validly waived his right to a
jury by pleading guilty. Mr. Baskins asked the court to allow him to withdraw his plea
and then at the next hearing, his counsel indicated that Mr. Baskins was withdrawing this
motion. In essence, Mr. Baskins was again waiving his right to a jury. The trial court had
an affirmative obligation to verify with Mr. Baskins that it was his intention to again
waive his right to go to trial and it would be under the same obligations at it would

normally be in a Rule 11 colloquy: it must verify specifically with the defendant whether
he is affirmatively waiving his rights.
The burden of compliance with rule 11 rests squarely upon the trial court, which
"means that the trial court [must] personally establish that the defendant's guilty
plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant
knowingly waived his . . . constitutional rights." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, P 11,
22P.3dl242.
State v. Alexander. 2009 UT App 188,J 6,214 P.3d 889. This requirement should be no
less in this case. The court had an obligation to establish, like the earlier plea before it,
that the defendant voluntarily waived this right.
In Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276,299 (1930), the Supreme Court dealt with
the question as to whether the Constitution prohibited the defendants from waiving their
right to a 12 person jury. All defendants had waived the right on the record, individually
and with the advice of counsel. IdL at 286-87. The court held that they could validly
waive their right to a jury, but certain safeguards had to be guaranteed:
Not only must the right of the accused to a trial by a constitutional jury be
jealously preserved, but the maintenance of the jury as a fact finding body in
criminal cases is of such importance and has such a place in our traditions, that,
before any waiver can become effective, the consent of government counsel and
the sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent
consent of the defendant. And the duty of the trial court in that regard is not to be
discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discretion, with an
eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departures from that mode of trial or from any
of the essential elements thereof, and with a caution increasing in degree as the
offenses dealt with increase in gravity.
I$L at 312-13.
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The rule of law is clear: before a court can allow a defendant to waive a
fundamental right, it has an obligation to question the defendant and obtain his express
and intelligent consent—he must unequivocally state that he waives the issues. This
cannot be performed perfunctorily, as was done by the court in this case.
C. The Trial Court Had an Affirmative Obligation to Make Factual Findings
According to Rule 12(e) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, "Where factual
issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings on the
record."
In State v. Humphrey. 2003 UT App. 333,79 P.3d 960 the defendant entered a
guilty plea. Prior to sentencing, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw the plea, which
was denied by the court. The defendant, this Court said, can meet his burden on
withdrawing the guilty plea by presenting some evidence that the plea was involuntary.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a).
Once such evidence is presented to the court, the court needs to assess the
credibility of the evidence and make detailed findings on all relevant facts. See
Id. Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the trial court to
state its findings on the record "where factual issues are involved in determining a
motion." Furthermore, the trial court's findings must be sufficiently detailed to
allow the appellate court the opportunity to adequately review the trial court's
decision. See State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880,882 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

State v. Humphrey. 2003 UT App. 333, J 10,79 P.3d 960 (emphasis added). In
Humphrey, this Court remanded the matter for the trial court to make necessary factual
findings regarding the motion to withdraw. Id
This error was fundamental, namely because this Court has an inadequate basis to
review whether Mr. Baskins validly withdrew his motion. If the court had personally
inquired the matter in more detail with the defendant and entered findings of fact, it
would enable this Court to engage in adequate appellate review. But in the absence of
actual findings, this Court is left to speculate and conjecture the defendant's intent by his
silence and by the statements of his attorney. This cannot be a valid basis to determine a
waiver of a fundamental right, like the right to a jury trial.
The state relies on two cases in support of its argument, both of which are
inapplicable to the case at hand. First, it relies on State v. Carapia. 2009 UT App 71. In
that case, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In that case, the
defendant withdrew the motion and it "was not addressed prior to sentencing" so this
Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The first major difference here is that the Mr.
Baskins did not unambiguously withdraw his motion. In Carapia. there was no dispute
about whether the defendant had actually withdrawn his motion—in fact the defendant
moved to dispose of his case so he could pursue a post-conviction remedy. Id. In essence,
he stipulated that the motion had been withdrawn. Secondly, in Carapia, the motion was
not addressed at sentencing. In this case, the matter was addressed by the court at
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sentencing. This difference is also fundamental because Carapia's case was dismissed
because of the absence of litigation on this issue. Mr. Baskins' case is different because
the trial court addressed his motion at sentencing.
The state also relies on State v. Corwell. 2005 UT 28, 114 P.3d 549 for the
proposition that a defendant's silence constitutes waiver of a constitutional right. Aplee's
Br. at 19. This is an inaccurate statement of the holding of Corwell. In this case, the
defendant, during the plea colloquy answered two of the court's questions in the
affirmative. Subsequently, the court asked her if she understood the importance of the
rights she was giving up. Apparently, Ms. Corwell's answer was inaudible. Despite the
inaudibility, this Court said that "the fact that the district court continued the plea
colloquy without interruption suggests that Corwell responded in the affirmative." State
v, Corwell. 2005 UT 28, J 5, 114 P.3d 549. Yet this is not even the holding of Corwell.
Corwell holds that the district court did not err when it informed Ms. Corwell of her right
to a speedy trial and when it incorporated the plea affidavit. Id. 5 22. In fact, at no point
was it alleged that Ms. Corwell said anything other than "Yes" in the inaudible portion of
the transcript. This Court never held, or even opined, that her silence meant acquiescence.
There was no allegation that she was even silent. It merely stated, in passing, that given a
gap in the recording and the subsequent conversation, it appeared the defendant had
audibly answered the court's question in the affirmative. This is far from the proposition
that a defendant's silence can be equated to a waiver of his constitutional rights.

Finally, the state alleges that Mr. Baskins' conduct is more akin to an Alford plea
"in all but name". Aplee's Br. at 21. The state argues that his conduct was consistent with
one entering a plea, but still disputing the facts of the case. Id. This approach is entirely
speculative and neglects the vast majority of actual information on the record. First, the
defendant affirmatively stated in his motion to withdraw that his attorney-client
relationship had deteriorated and that he was "misled into believing the true nature of the
plea deal." (R. 32-35.) Second, the court's single question failed to clarify that counsel's
representations adequately represented defendant's state of mind. Given Mr. Baskins'
previously-stated difficulties with counsel, the court had an independent obligation to
ensure Mr. Baskins was truly wishing to withdraw his motion. Finally, at no point during
the sentencing proceeding did Mr. Baskins affirmatively state that he was withdrawing
his motion. In fact, the only thing he consistently did was maintain his innocence. The
state, on the other hand, must speculate that by Mr. Baskins' silence, and by his previous
ability to jump in and stop things when he did not agree, that it somehow meant that his
silence constituted a waiver in this case. This is not the constitutional standard for a valid
waiver—there must be a dialogue between the court and the defendant to ensure the
decision is being voluntarily entered. This could have been satisfied in this case by one
additional question: "Just to clarify, Mr. Baskins, is it your intention to withdraw the
motion you've filed?" Even better, the trial court could have asked two or three more
questions: "You've indicated in here that you are dissatisfied with your attorney. Is he
accurately stating that you wish to withdraw the motion?" "Are you now satisfied that
11

this plea deal is in your best interests?" Questions like this would have easily resolved the
problem.
Ironically, Alford, as cited by the state, supports Mr. Baskins' argument that a
more thorough colloquy needed to take place. In order to enter an Alford plea, the court
must conduct an even more thorough colloquy:
By entering an Alford plea, a defendant does not admit guilt. Rather, the defendant
enters a guilty plea because he recognizes that a prosecutor has enough evidence
to obtain a guilty verdict. In North Carolina v. Alford, Mr. Alford argued that he
was innocent of the murder charge but pled guilty to second degree murder in an
attempt to avoid the threat of a sentence of death for first degree murder. 400 U.S.
25,28,91 S. Ct. 160,27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). The United States Supreme Court
stated that "while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an
express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the
imposition of criminal penalty." Id. at 37. The Court went on to hold that "[a]n
individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly
consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to
admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime." Id. The Court concluded
that this type of plea would be appropriate when "a defendant intelligently
concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the
judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt." Id.
State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1,5 9 n. 2,647 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (emphasis added).
If a trial court plans to take an Alford plea, it has an obligation to ensure, on the
record, that the defendant is knowingly and intelligently choosing this course of action:
While typically guilty pleas "consist of both a waiver of trial and an express
admission of guilt," Alford pleas are ones in which a defendant "voluntarily,
knowingly, and understandingly consents to the imposition of a prison sentence
even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting
the crime." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,37,27 L. Ed. 2d 162,91 S. Ct.
160,167 (1970). The Alford court held that "an express admission of guilt... is
not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty." Id. at 37-38,

91 S. Ct. at 167. The Court upheld defendant's guilty plea after reviewing the plea
"in light of the evidence against [the defendant) which substantially negated his
claim of innocence and which further provided a means by which the judge could
test whether the plea was being intelligently entered" Id. at 38,91 S. Ct. at 167.
The Alford court further stated:
Because of the importance of protecting the innocent and of insuring that
guilty pleas are a product of free and intelligent choice, various state and
federal court decisions properly caution that pleas coupled with claims of
innocence should not be accepted unless there is a factual basis for the plea,
(citations omitted) and until the judge taking the plea has inquired into and
sought to resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim of
innocence.
Id. at 38 n.10,91 S. Ct. at 167-68 n.10.
State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666,672 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added). Alford pleas
are a particular anomaly. A defendant will submit to a sentence, but will not accept guilt.
Because of this odd disparity, the courts have held that judges have an affirmative
obligation in such cases to diligently inquire into the disparity and try to resolve the
conflict as to why the defendant is entering a plea.
If the state is contending that Mr. Baskins' conduct was more representative of an
Alford plea, then this only further underscores the fact that the trial court had an
affirmative obligation to resolve why there appeared to be a conflict in Mr. Baskins'
behavior. He pled guilty but still maintained his innocence; he had filed a motion
asserting his innocence. At a minimum, the trial court had an obligation to try to
reconcile with the defendant, on the record, how he had resolved these conflicts.
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CONCLUSION
Based on Mr. Baskins opening brief, he asks this Court to find that he did not enter
a knowing and voluntary plea. But if the Court is inclined to address the jurisdictional
issue, he asks the Court to remand this matter to the trial court in order to make findings
as to whether Mr. Baskins validly and expressly waived his right to a trial by
withdrawing his motion and ultimately whether Mr. Baskins plea should be validly
withdrawn.
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